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The paper analyses the relationship between the financial structure of the different 
institutional units in the Czech Republic and their performance, by testing several theoretical 
hypotheses. It employs Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate separately corporate and 
individual farms’ technical efficiency, and investigates the effect of indebtedness on 
efficiency in a second stage, accounting for potential endogeneity. 
No substantial differences were detected between individual and corporate farms. For both 
groups higher long-term indebtedness negatively affects farm performance (agency theory and 
adjustment hypothesis), while the latter is used for appraising loan applications (credit 
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Performance of different institutional units in the Czech Republic 
and the role of external financing 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite the emergence of a great number of individual farms during the transition, 
corporate farms still cultivate the majority of the land area in the Czech Republic, 73 per cent 
(Curtiss 2002), and are the main agricultural producers. The performance of these farms 
relative to the other main institutional unit, the individual (family) farms, has been a subject of 
a large number of studies and has been central to the policy debate about the viability of 
corporate farms in the enlarged EU (Hughes 2000; Mathijs et al. 2001; Curtiss 2002; 
Davidova et al. 2003; Gorton and Davidova 2004). This paper contributes to this debate by 
analysing the relationship between the financial structure of the different institutional units in 
the Czech Republic and their technical efficiency. The quantitative results are expanded by a 
case study.  
The paper employs a two-stage estimation of the effect of indebtedness on non-
parametric estimates of technical efficiency. It, first, investigates the relative technical 
efficiency of corporate and individual farms applying Data Envelopment Analysis. Then it 
tests several hypotheses about the relationship between indebtedness and technical efficiency 
stemming from different theoretical approaches. The study accounts for the potential 
endogeneity of the financial variable with the efficiency scores, first, by testing for exogeneity 
of the financial variable in the Tobit model, following Smith and Blundell (1986), and second, 
by applying the estimator proposed by Amemiya (1978) in the cases where exogeneity is 
rejected. Finally, the paper reports results from semi-structured interviews with banks and 
corporate farms about the relationship between credit and performance carried out in February 
2005. 
The next section summarises the theoretical debate about the relationship between the 
farm financial structure and farm efficiency. Section 3 provides characteristics of the debt 
structure of the different institutional units in the Czech Republic. Section 4 describes the 
methodology and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Theoretical  considerations 
2.1.  Performance of different institutional farming units 
After more than a decade of transition, questions about whether or not one 
organisational farm type, namely individual farms, is more efficient than other types, such as 
corporate structures, are still topical (for a summary of the debate see Gorton and Davidova 
2004). At the beginning of the transition process, the most common view was that once the 
centrally planned system had been dismantled, farm structures would go back to their 
‘normal’ trajectory, namely smaller individual/family type farms (Csaki and Lerman 1996). 
On economic grounds, this assumption was based on the view that family farms are more 
efficient than co-operatives and other types of corporate farms because they have low 
transaction costs (Schmitt 1991). So far, the results from the empirical studies have not 
consistently supported this proposition (Mathijs and Vranken 2001, Mathijs et al. 1999; 
Curtiss 2002). Mathijs and Vranken (2001) argue that individual farms appear to be more 
efficient for crop production but such advantages disappear in the dairy sector. They justify 
their results with the propositions of Allen and Lueck (1998) that problems of ‘factory style’ 
farms are more severe where production is spatially diffused and sequential as in these cases 
the costs of supervising and monitoring of hired labour are higher, e.g. in crop farming. Table 
1 summarises the results of some studies on Czech farms and illustrates well the debatable 
issue about the relative performance of the two institutional units in the Czech Republic.   2
    
TABLE 1: Findings from studies about performance of corporate and individual farms in the Czech Republic 
Results Study Measure  and  method
used 
  Production 





Crop farms  0.64  0.62  0.46    55 
Livestock farms  0.79  -  0.67  1996  30 
Mathijs et al. (1999)  Total technical 
efficiency - DEA 
Mixed farms  0.56  0.58  0.59    142 
Hughes (2000)  TFP - Thornqvist  All farms  0.95  1.00  1.09  1996  411 
Mathijs et al. (2001)  Total technical 
efficiency - DEA 
Crop farms  0.53  0.39  0.42  2000  699 
Wheat farms  0.87  0.87  0.88    285 
Rapeseed farms  1.11  1.16  1.17  1996-98  216 
Curtiss (2002)  TFP - SFA 
Sugar beet farms  0.98  1.02  1.09    126 
Davidova et al. (2003)  TFP - Thornqvist  All farms  0.95  0.95 and 0.99  1.01  1999  823 
 
 2.2.  Relationship between farm performance and credit 
Farm performance and external financing (credit) are closely interrelated. The most 
obvious relationship between these two variables is that credit helps farmers solve their cash 
flow problems. Credit is necessary for the smooth application of farm technologies, 
particularly in the New Member States (NMS) where farmers have a limited capacity for 
internal accumulation. The ERS/USDA (2002), in its study of the livestock sector in the 
economies in transition identified credit as a major constraint to producers and processors, 
limiting the possibilities for expansion and upgrading. It argued that the limited access to 
credit locked producers into their existing capital stock. Against this background, credit 
appears to be a positive determinant of performance. However, some theoretical frameworks 
propose a negative sign for the relationship between performance and credit. 
Three main theoretical approaches have been employed to hypothesise this 
relationship. Nasr et al. (1998) transpose to the farming sector the free cash flow approach 
developed by Jensen (1986) for corporate firms. Jensen formulates a hypothesis about the 
benefits of debt as a motivating force for firm managers to become more efficient because of 
the threat of failing to service the debt. The free cash flow theory suggests that farmers who 
are indebted need to meet their repayment obligations and therefore are motivated to limit 
laxness or waste of resources. 
The agency theory approach is based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency cost 
concept and emphasises the lenders’ costs of monitoring the borrowers, costs that might be 
transferred to borrowers. As a result, highly indebted farmers might be high cost and thus less 
efficient. The agency theory is a useful framework for conceptualising the negative impact of 
indebtedness on technical efficiency. However, there are other intuitive/empirical 
interpretations of the negative relationship during critical stages of farm adjustment to new 
economic conditions. For Russia, Sotnikov (1998) hypothesises a negative relationship 
between financial structure and technical efficiency as highly indebted farmers may not have 
access to credit for working capital and, consequently, cannot apply the necessary 
technological processes on time. This is consistent with the study of transition of New 
Zealand farms from a state of higher protection to more market exposure (Paul et al. 2000). 
According to the authors’ adjustment hypothesis, farmers with lower financial exposure 
would adjust more easily to the change and would therefore be more efficient.  
The third main approach, the credit evaluation approach, expects banks to prefer 
borrowers who are low risk, thus more technically efficient. This approach is based on the fact 
that, prior to granting a loan, banks evaluate the applications according to the applicants’ 
probability of repayment. For this they rely on various variables that characterise applicants’ 
creditworthiness, such as profitability, liquidity, solvency, repayment capacity, financial 
efficiency, collateral, management and other variables (Ellinger et al. 1992). Technical 
efficiency might therefore be among the variables taken into consideration either explicitly or 
embedded in other variables such as management and repayment capacity. The relationship 
postulated by the credit evaluation approach indicates potential endogeneity of indebtedness 
indicators and technical efficiency. Although O’Neill and Matthews (2001) argue that the 
positive impact of the debt to asset ratio on technical efficiency found for Irish farms might 
suggest an inverse causality, with the better managers more able to borrow, none of the 
previous studies have explicitly accounted for the endogeneity implied by this approach.  
In summary, three approaches hypothesise an influence of indebtedness on technical 
efficiency but with a different sign and a different direction. They are summarised in Table 2. 
However, as Shankar et al. (2001) note, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. In 
particular, the credit evaluation approach might hold together with another approach. The 
credit evaluation approach would indicate an inverse causality and can be revealed by 
evidence of endogeneity between technical efficiency scores and indebtedness. The 
significance and sign of the parameter of the indebtedness variable in the regression of 
technical efficiency scores can indicate support for one of the other approaches. 
  3TABLE 2: Theoretical approaches and hypotheses about the relationship between 
indebtedness and technical efficiency 
Approach Hypothesis 
Free cash flow  (+) 




indebtedness Î technical efficiency 
Credit evaluation   (+) 
indebtedness Í technical efficiency 
 
3.  Characteristics of farm debts in the Czech Republic 
The situation in the Czech Republic is specific from the point of view of the so-called 
‘transformation debts’ inherited by some corporate farms that are successors of the former 
state and collective farms. In general, corporate farms have more liabilities than individual 
farms. In 2003, corporate farms in the Czech Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) had a 
debt to asset ratio of 0.46 whilst this ratio was 0.14 for individual farms (VUZE 2004).   
However, a high proportion of these debts stems from the reform process itself and consists of 
non-bank liabilities (77 per cent for the corporate farms in 2003). The producer co-operatives 
have non-bank long-term liabilities to the owners of co-operative assets who received shares 
during the land reform process, but decided not to farm individually and to leave their land 
and their shares of non-land assets within the new co-operatives. The limited liability 
companies are indebted to the state as they acquired assets from the former state farms. 
However, the co-operatives did not begin to pay back their debts to asset owners until 2000 
and the limited liability companies pay very little interest on their loans from the state, so they 
exhibit low financial stress (Davidova et al. 2003). This is not the case for the de novo 
individual farms and some of the joint stock companies created post-reform since they have to 
pay their debts to the commercial lenders on tight schedules. This specific situation of farms 
in transition countries gives grounds for proposing that the relationship between the financial 
structure and technical efficiency might be different for the corporate farms compared to the 
de novo individual farms. On this basis, two propositions are advanced. First, the credit 
evaluation approach is expected to hold for individual but not for corporate farms due to the 
large share of non-bank debts in the debt portfolio of the latter. In other words, exogeneity of 
indebtedness is expected to be rejected for individual farms and accepted for corporate farms. 
Second, concerning the effect of indebtedness on technical efficiency, a different approach is 
hypothesised for individual farms, on the one hand, and for corporate farms, on the other. 
Individual farms are expected to be affected by high transaction costs of screening and 
monitoring, as they are smaller, more numerous, scattered in the rural areas and often without 
a credit history. For this reason, the agency theory approach is hypothesised to hold for 
individual farms. As for corporate farms, they are already highly indebted and might not be 
able to contract additional debts. Hence, for these farms the adjustment approach is expected 
to be valid. Hence, as both approaches propose a negative impact of indebtedness on technical 
efficiency, for both individual and corporate farms a negative sign of the relationship is 
hypothesised. 
 
  44. Methodology   
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used for estimating technical efficiency. The 
study employs an input oriented single-output multi-input farm level model using FADN data. 
Total output in value is used as the single output variable. Four inputs are included: utilised 
agricultural area (UAA) in hectares (ha) as a land factor; annual work units (AWU) as a 
labour factor; depreciation plus interest as a capital factor; and the value of intermediate 
consumption as a variable input factor. Four frontiers are estimated, one for each 
specialisation, livestock and crop, and each management form, individual and corporate 
farms. The underlying assumption is that the production technology is different for different 
specialisations and legal forms. Individual and corporate farms might not have had access to 
the same technology. For example, managers of the limited liability companies have some 
managerial experience from the pre-reform period and access to machinery from the previous 
state farms at favourable conditions (Gorton and Davidova 2004). Estimating separate 
frontiers does not allow the relative performance of the technologies to be compared directly, 
but indicates how the individual observations lie on average in relation to the efficiency 
frontier of the relevant sub-sample.  
The effect of credit on the efficiency scores is investigated with a Tobit model, which 
is required as the efficiency distribution is censored at one. A Tobit model is estimated for 
each of the four sub-samples (livestock/crop, individual/corporate). The dependent variable 
used in all regressions is an inefficiency score, computed as the inverse of the total technical 
efficiency score. Two financial explanatory variables are used in turn, the debt to asset ratio 
showing the long-term capital position, and the current debt to current asset ratio indicating 
the liquidity of the farm, namely the farm’s ability to convert assets into cash quickly and to 
meet its operational needs. The use of two financial variables might give some insights into 
the possible differences in the sign and strength of the relationship where investment credit as 
opposed to credit for working capital is concerned. Based on previous research on farm 
efficiency in developing and transition countries (e.g. Sotnikov 1998; Brümmer 2001; Mathijs 
and Vranken 2001; Curtiss 2002) a number of other explanatory variables are included: land 
area (UAA) for crop farms and livestock units for livestock farms as a size variable; the ratio 
of capital (depreciation plus interest) to labour (AWU) and the ratio of land (UAA) to labour 
(AWU) as technology proxies; the percentage of hired labour and the percentage of rented 
land used to capture the quality of labour and the institutions for land tenure respectively; four 
regional dummies used as proxies for environment characteristics. 
As the main interest is on the financial management of the different institutional units 
and its implications for technical efficiency, the financial variables are of central importance. 
The main methodological problem is the potential endogeneity in respect to the credit 
evaluation approach. For this reason, exogeneity of the indebtedness variable is tested with the 
test proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986). In case of rejection of exogeneity, the estimator 
used is the one proposed by Amemiya (1978). The method relies on applying the generalised 
least squares to the relationship between the Tobit model’s structural parameters and its 
reduced form parameters. The instruments used are based on Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) 
study of the determinants of the capital structure of public firms in the G-7 countries: the 
value of total output in natural logarithm, the ratio of fixed to total assets and a farm specific 
cost-revenue ratio.  
The study draws data from the 1999 Czech FADN dataset. The useable records 
include 753 farms. From these 753 farms, two sub-samples are constructed depending on 
whether farms specialise in crop or livestock, defined here as farms for which at least 65 per 
cent of the value of total agricultural output comes from crop or livestock. The extracted 
livestock sub-sample contains 88 farms and the crop sub-sample, 256 farms. The farms in 
each specialisation are also split according to their management form into individual and 
corporate sub-samples. The final four sub-samples used, individual livestock, individual crop, 
corporate livestock and corporate crop, consist of 53, 221, 35 and 35 farms respectively. 
  5An additional qualitative investigation of the relationship between performance and 
credit was carried out through interviews with farms and banks, conducted in the Czech 
Republic in February 2005. The objective of these case studies was to give additional insights 
into the reality faced by Czech farms in the rural credit market. Banks with a history of 
lending to agriculture were selected for the case study, while the farms interviewed had had 
some loans from banks in the past three years. This work is in progress, and so far only two 
banks and two corporate farms have been interviewed. 
5. Results 
5.1.  Results from the empirical study 
The efficiency estimates presented in Table 3 reveal that, contrary to some theoretical 
expectations related to transaction costs, overall, corporate farms appear to be more totally 
technically efficient than individual farms. This is consistent with Hughes’ (2000) Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) findings for the Czech Republic. The main total technical efficiency 
differences between the individual and corporate farms appear in livestock production where 
the corporate farms are much more efficient (total technical efficiency scores 0.55 and 0.83 
respectively). The differences in average total efficiency estimates between the two 
management types in crop production are small. 
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The test of the three theoretical hypotheses about the relationship between credit and 
technical efficiency was done with a Tobit model as explained earlier. Results of the model 
are presented in Table 4, and are limited to the variables of interest, that is to say debt to asset 
ratio and current debt to current asset ratio. As the dependent variable is the inefficiency 
score, the parameters with negative signs indicate sources of efficiency and vice versa. In the 
table, a row shows whether exogeneity of the financial variable was rejected or accepted. 
Exogeneity of debt to asset variable was rejected for all sub-samples. This rejects our initial 
proposition that the credit evaluation would only hold for individual farms. It suggests that ten 
years after the beginning of the transition process individual and corporate farms have started 
to be treated equally by lenders and have both been subject to strict loan evaluation. However, 
the results of the model including the current debt to current asset ratio reveal that exogeneity 
is accepted for all individual farms and for the livestock corporate farms. This suggests that 
lenders might evaluate more strictly the applications for investment credit and have a looser 
approach to short-term loans for working capital (the latter have often been guaranteed with 
the future crop). The results do not reveal a statistically significant relationship of the current 
debt to current asset ratio with inefficiency scores for all sub-samples. However, a significant 
impact of the debt to asset ratio, thus of the long-term financial structure, is identified for all 
farm groups. The debt to asset ratio is a source of inefficiency for all farm groups except for 
  6the individual crop farms where the increase in indebtedness is positively related to technical 
efficiency. In other words, the increase in investment debts negatively influences the technical 
efficiency of corporate farms and of individual livestock farms. This suggests that, either due 
to the agency theory argument for individual farms or to adjustment hardships for corporate 
farms, the relation between the financial structure and technical efficiency is negative. 
TABLE 4: Results from the Tobit model on the total technical inefficiency score: 
exogeneity test and estimated parameter of the indebtedness variables 
  Individual farms  Corporate farms 
  Livestock Crop Livestock Crop 
Debt to asset ratio 
H0: exogeneity  rejected ***  rejected ***  rejected ***  rejected * 








Current debt to current asset ratio 









*,**,*** : 10, 5, 1 percent significance. Standard errors into brackets. 
5.2.  Results from the case studies 
The case studies were aimed at providing additional insights into the hypotheses 
about the relationship between credit and performance in the conditions of the Czech 
transition. For both banks studied, staff at the head offices in Prague was interviewed. Both 
banks started lending to agriculture in 1990. Five percent of Bank A’s portfolio were in 
agriculture, while lending to farmers accounted for less than one percent of the portfolio of 
Bank B (see Table 5). On the farm side, both farms interviewed were corporate mixed farms 
(see Table 6). Farm 1 operated an area of 1,250 hectares. It cultivated cereals and rapeseed, 
and had beef and dairy cattle. It was located in the less favoured area of West Moravia. This 
farm had received a subsidised investment loan for a tractor from a commercial bank. Farm 2 
had 850 hectares and produced cereals, sugar beet and eggs, in the lowland along the river 
Labe. This farm had received two loans in the past three years, both times from a commercial 
bank. Both loans were subsidised and were for a harvester and for working capital. Both farms 
benefited from preferential loans disbursed by the Support and Guarantee Fund for 
Agriculture and Forestry (SGFAF). The farms were charged 1 percent and 3 percent interest 
rate respectively, which was lower than the 5.3 percent average market rate (Ministry of 
Finance 2003). 
The first part of the interviews aimed at gathering detailed information about the 
lending process. Banks were asked about the procedure for evaluation of farmers’ loan 
applications, the types of costs they charged to farmers, and how the loans were monitored. 
Farmers were asked about their loan characteristics, about the way their applications were 
evaluated, the number of visits to the banks and the waiting time during the application 
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process, the additional costs they were charged, and how they were monitored. This part of the 
interview looked for indication about the existence, or the lack, of agency costs, and tried to 
identify whether the credit evaluation approach was adequate to interpret the relationships 
between lenders and borrowers in the Czech Republic. 
Overall, the results of the quantitative analysis were confirmed by the case studies, as 
both banks reported to consider farm performance when evaluating applications. Farms also 
recognised that their performance was at the basis of the appraisal process, suggesting that the 
credit evaluation was an appropriate approximation of the reality. Farm indebtedness level at 
the time of application has also played an important role in the application’s evaluation as 
acknowledged by both banks and Farm 1. This gives some support for the adjustment 
hypothesis, as corporate farms are known to be highly indebted and this could prevent them 
from receiving further credit. In addition, the agency costs transferred to farmers seem to be 
not negligible, as both banks gave details of several fees and costs charged to farmers during 
the application process, namely administrative and insurance fees, and costs for screening and 
monitoring. Both farmers confirmed these facts and Farmer 2 also reported four visits to the 
bank before getting a loan. 
The second part of the interview consisted of a broader discussion about banks’ 
relations with farmers and about farmers’ opinion regarding the use of credit and the loan 
applications. Banks and farmers were also presented with several statements and asked to 
choose the most appropriate. The interviews with banks suggested that, although the staff 
considered farmers as reliable borrowers who usually repay their debt on time, they admitted 
having insufficient information and experience for lending to the farming sector. Loans to 
farms have only been a marginal part of the banks’ operations and banks have not had 
separate statistical data about the loans to agriculture. For this reason it was not possible to get 
precise figures (average interest rate, average loan value, etc) about these loans. Overall, the 
interviews showed that the agency theory and adjustment hypothesis approaches were more 
appropriate to represent the situation faced by corporate farms in the Czech Republic. Both 
farm managers were concerned about the high costs of credit which they thought might 
threaten their business, supporting the agency theory approach. But the adjustment hypothesis 
seemed to be the prevailing approach, as for example both farm managers stressed that the 
loans that they received were vital for the survival of their business.  TABLE 5: The banks interviewed in the case studies: characteristics and loan process 
  Bank A  Bank B 
Type  Foreign commercial  Foreign commercial 
Location of head office  Prague  Prague 
Lends to agriculture since:  1990  1990 
Loans to agriculture (share of the portfolio size)  5%  < 1% 
Evaluation of farmers’ loans applications using:  Farm turnover, performance, management 











Costs for evaluating creditworthiness 
Administrative fees 
Costs for evaluating creditworthiness 
Costs for developing a business plan 
Fees for visits to the farm 
Visits to the farms during the loan process  Sometimes  More than 2 
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TABLE 6: The farms interviewed in the case studies: characteristics and credit history 
  Farm 1  Farm 2 
Type      Corporate Corporate
UAA          1,250 ha 850 ha
Production  Cereals, rapeseed, cattle  Cereals, sugar beet, laying hens 
Loans     
Bank type           Commercial Commercial Commercial
Loan type  Investment  Investment  Working capital 
Loan value (euros)  135,020  101,260  84,390 
Interest rate per year  1%  3%  3% 
Subsidised loan?           Yes Yes Yes






Application     




Existence of collateral 
Credit history 
Farm performance 
Existence of collateral 
Credit history 
Number of visits to the bank  1  4  4 
Waiting time  7 days  1 day  10 days 
Costs charged during the loan 
application 
Costs for developing a business plan 
Administrative fees 
Insurance fees 
Costs for developing a business plan 
Costs for collateral evaluation 
Administrative fees 
Costs for developing a business plan 
Costs for collateral evaluation 
Administrative fees 
 6. Conclusion 
The paper aimed at studying the performance of corporate farms and individual farms 
in the Czech Republic, and at exploring the role of credit on performance. The non-parametric 
DEA method was used to estimate technical efficiency. Farms were classified according to 
specialisation and management type and a separate frontier for each specialisation and 
management type was estimated. At the second stage, a Tobit model was used to investigate 
the variables that may explain the variability in efficiency, focusing on the impact of financial 
structure on farm performance and accounting for potential endogeneity between financial 
variables and technical efficiency. Additionally, a case study was done in the Czech Republic 
to farmers and banks. 
The results of DEA point estimates indicate that, overall, corporate farms in the 
Czech Republic are more clustered towards their technically efficient frontier than the 
individual farms. This suggests that management experience and practices in the post-reform 
individual farms are on average still deficient in comparison to the successors of the former 
state and collective farms in the sense that they are more heterogeneous and there are farms 
lagging substantially behind the best practice. With regard to the Czech farm structures, 
although the indebtedness of the corporate farms has been high on the political agenda in the 
Czech Republic, particularly in view of the viability of these farms with their rescheduled 
debts in the enlarged Union, the analysis did not detect substantial differences in the 
relationship of financial exposure with technical efficiency between the two management 
types. Both seem to be treated equally by the lenders, thus for both management types the 
credit evaluation approach holds at least for the long-term financial structure. The effect of 
long-term indebtedness on farm technical efficiency is negative. It is claimed here that this is 
due to the agency theory argument for the individual farms and to the adjustment argument for 
the corporate farms. Additionally, this research found empirical evidence of the credit 
evaluation approach for investment loans. The case studies presented in this paper abound in 
these senses, as they highlighted the high borrowing costs faced by farms (agency theory), the 
necessity of credit to survive (adjustment hypothesis), and the consideration of performance 
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